This paper updates previous research on the vulnerability of energy transmission systems in the central and eastern United States to earthquake hazard. The paper will present and summarize the recent research completed on these systems with reference to a range of earthquake scenarios commencing at a M6 earthquake. An assessment will be provided of the vulnerability of the transmission systems to earthquake loading, and a summary provided of future research that may reduce the hazard to energy transmission systems. This region represents 3 percent of the world's population, and it has been seismically quiet for 100 years. The probability of a major earthquake in this century will be considered as part of the assessment.
Introduction
The United States energy distribution systems are vulnerable to failure from a variety of sources both natural and from human intervention. The AAES (1986) report reviews the vulnerability of the energy distribution system to an earthquake for the central and eastern United States with the data coverage for the previous decade to the AAES report. The energy distribution 3 systems across the U.S. consist primarily of pipelines, railroads, water carriers, motor carriers, and electrical transmission. While pipelines, water carriers and railroads are typically interstate distribution systems, electrical and motor carrier distribution systems are primarily intrastate. This paper reviews the vulnerability of these energy distribution systems to earthquake damage.
The oil distribution system has changed significantly from the movement of barrels by wagon and train common in the late 1800s to modern pipelines and the consumption of energy products has increased in the USA since the 1800s. This increased consumption continues a trend from the time of the 40 gallon barrels 4 of kerosene in Pennsylvania that anecdotal evidence recounts were filled to 42 gallons if 40 gallons was purchased, creating the defined barrel of oil product [ abbrev: bbl(US, petrol) equivalent to ~ 0.1589 m 3 ] (Cardarelli 1997) . The total US energy consumption at the beginning of the twenty-first century is about 105 exajoules (~ 99 quadrillion BTU, abbreviated Quad). As the complexity of the urban landscapes and human economy changes, so there are changes and increasing complexity in the distribution system for all energy forms, which can result in some regional areas being dependent on a particular energy delivery system. Disruption of the energy delivery system can lead to disruption of the economy and the safety of the inhabitants of such a regional area. The supply of petroleum to Maine is one example of reliance on shipping. Shipping can become icebound, disrupting supply. The vulnerability aspect of interest in this study is the damage to the distribution system from an earthquake loading. The area of significant previous seismic activity is a regional band stretching from Midland, Texas to Eastport, Maine which has been the subject of significant research work by the NSF earthquake research centers in Illinois and New York in the last score years.
Literature Review
The second author in preparing the research for the AAES report provides a through summary of the issues and data related to the earthquake threat, the recent earthquake research, the threat issues between the east and western coasts, extent of the energy distribution systems within the USA and the volume of material being transported in these systems. The critical finding from the AAES research is the vulnerability of the interstate pipeline distribution systems to an earthquake, with particular emphasis on the threat posed by an event originating within the New Madrid Seismic Zone. The AAES report shows the location of the major and moderate earthquakes in the lower 48 states up to 1986, Figure 1 shows earthquakes from 1568 to 2003 for the USA. Richter (1958) provides a convenient starting point for considering the developments in the field of seismology in the last two score and five years. There are still a number of significant issues to be resolved in the field of seismology particularly for intraplate regions. Rather than diverging into these issues, the objective of this literature review is to consider the current level of knowledge for those research areas that impact on an assessment of the vulnerability of the distribution systems to an earthquake threat.
Johnson and Kanter (1990) outline the problems of determining the seismicity of intraplate regions. The New Madrid Seismic zone (NMSZ) represents a distinct intraplate earthquake hazard (Nuttli 1986 ). Richter discusses the problem of great earthquakes with a magnitude greater than M8. There is no credible research, since the time of Nuttli and Richter, disputing the accepted findings that the 1811-1812 earthquakes were in the great category, as clearly defined in Richter's text. The critical issue is in determining the hazard from this time-limited dataset and from recent geological research. The past frequency of great events in the NMZS is 400 to 500 years from sand boil data (Tuttle et al. 2002) .
The 2001 Gujarat earthquake and the NMZS sand boil data highlight the issue of making a Poissonian or a characteristic assumptions in determining the likely frequency of a great future earthquakes (MAE Center 2002 ). An earthquake with a probable recurrence interval of 1,400 to 2,600 years struck the Abruzzo region of Italy on January 13, 1915 and killed 32,000 (Ward and Valensise 1989) . Even a near complete written history for a fault near Rome can be insufficient to warn of silent active faults, as Kafka and Levin (2000) discuss in relation to several tectonic areas. The earthquake hazard in the CEUS is significant and real and corresponds in large part to the population centres ( Figure 2 ).
Figure 2. Population Centers (after USDOT -OPS)
Urban development in the south and southwest as well as the other more established regions of the CEUS in the last two decades has required a commensurate development for the natural gas pipeline de livery system. The AAES report provides a map of the major pipeline routes for natural gas in 1986 and provides the sizes and capacities of the main pipelines ( Figure 3 ). Natural gas accounts for about 20 percent of the US energy supply. The potential for increased supply in the US is in the Alaskan fields holding 1 Tm 3 . The development of system of pipelines to move this energy to California and perhaps the eastern States will require a substantial national investment (NEPDG 2001) traversing a region of significant interplate seismic risk. AAES provides details of the specific pipes and the capacities, and the crude oil pipeline routes. The critical crude oil pipelines, including a 1000, 560 and 510 mm set pass through the Mississippi floodplain and meet at Patoka, Illinois. These three pipelines can deliver (approx.) 1.18, 0.37, and 0.29 m 3 /s respectively, assuming a velocity of flow of 1.5 m/s. Crude oil (~ 1.8 Mm 3 /day) is imported to the US. The CEUS has major refineries accepting imported oil in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
Coal production rose from 644 in 1985 to 974 teragrams (Tg) in 2000. The production of coal has risen in the states west of the Mississippi River in this period so that the split of coal production is approximately 50 percent in each region compared to 70 percent in the eastern region in 1985. The comments in the AAES report are still applicable to the vulnerability of the coal system to earthquake damage. The damage is still likely to be limited because of the diversity of the location of the coalmines and the use of trains as the primary transport method. The rail system has significant built in redundancy compared to a pipeline system.
The NEPDG Report identifies a number of constraint regions in the electrical transmission system ( Figure 5 ). Demand for a stable electricity supply is exceeding the US economy and political systems capacity to deliver this increased transmission capacity. The constraint point in southern Missouri is close to the NMZS which was a significant problem identified in the AAES report. The interesting feature of this g raph is the relative stability of the annual energy consumption per person in the US from 1970 to the present time, at 350 GJ.
This statistical observation suggests that the energy usage will grow in direct proportion to the population increase and is reasonable independent of the economic growth . The annual rate of population increase in the last 30-year period is 1.0 ± 0.1%. The projected population using a one percent rate for the period to 2020 is 330 million persons, with a upper and lower estimate of 355 to 320 million, based on the variation in the growth rate in the last 50 years. The estimated annual energy consumption in the year 2020 ranges from 114 to 132 EJ for the range of the population estimate and the average and peak values for the annual energy consumption per person. The National Energy Policy Development Group estimate of the energy consumption in 2020 suggests a population used for this estimate of 422 million representing a 2 per cent population increase for the 20-year period. The population growth rate peaked at 2 percent in 1950 for a brief period and was at that sustained level prior to the First World War.
The conclusion remains that the increase in energy consumption will require the development of new energy sources or places an increased reliance on imported energy. The other element that has not been explored is the issue of increased cost for energy as the remainder of the world moves towards the level of energy usage in the developed world. This type of problem would tend to reinforce the development of efficient energy sources in the US over imported product. This significant national issue is barely addressed in the recent NEPDG Report. (Figure 7) . The critical hazard areas are the NMZS, Charleston SC, and the upper reaches of NY and into Canada. AAES (1986, Figure 7) show the principal fault areas in the CEUS. Johnson and Kanter (1990) provide an excellent summary of the issues in developing an understanding of the problems associated with determining the hazard from intraplate earthquakes. Richter's comments on the issue of "seismically quiet areas of the world" reinforce the views of Johnson and Kanter.
Seismic Risk

USGS (2002) provide the estimated hazard from earthquake in the CEUS
Figure 7. CEUS Earthquake Hazard 2500-year return period
There are two significant issues to answer reliably the larger question of the vulnerability of the energy distribution systems in the Central and Eastern United States. The AAES report adequately addresses the issues i n the western US. The problem of 0.5 to 2 Hz pulses with a peak at 1 Hz in large intraplate events represents a significant pulse loading to structures such as nuclear power stations and transmission towers. Newmark and Hall (Newmark and Hall 1978) developed a method to consider this problem, although for a lack of data on intraplate events maintained the constant velocity region for the typical nuclear power station spectra. Nichols in the MAE report (2002) considered the mathematical properties of the 0.5 to 3 Hertz region of the frequency spectra in intraplate events after discussions with Hall 5 . The critical point relates to the non-conservative physical interpretation of the "constant velocity region" of all current design earthquake spectra. Newmark and Hall demonstrate clearly the superposition of waves that create the apparent constant velocity region in smaller events. Nevertheless, from basic thermodynamics and wave mechanics considerations , and confirmed from actual event data such as the Fast Fourier transform of the 1985 Nahanni event the hypothesis "that the constant velocity region of the spectra exists in all events and forms part of any design spectra" cannot be supported for all intraplate events. This is the most significant issue in the CEUS requiring research.
Silent active faults occur. A "fundamental buckling" of the intraplate surface in the CEUS is suggested in Figure 7 as noted by Denham et. al., (1981) for the Australian continental region. The USGS attempts with the estimated seismic hazard to determine a reasonable bounding function expressed in terms of a 475 and 2500-year hazard at a frequency of 1 and 5 Hz for the design of structures. The assumption is that smaller event delineate where larger events will occur and that we have sufficient historical records to accurately locate the hazardous faults and intrusions such as the NMSZ. There are insufficient historical data and subsurface geological data to determine if all silent active faults in the CEUS and the associated hazard were identified by the USGS. A simple consideration of the mathematical probability of earthquakes faults with a 2500-year return period within a written history that is really no longer than 400 to 500 years suggests that further peaks will develop or existing peaks be enlarged on the CEUS earthquake hazard map. The 1915 Abruzzo earthquake clearly shows this problem, and highlights that a scientific solution does not currently exist beyond the work of the USGS. In the simplest terms, there is a non-zero probability that the bounding function developed for the CEUS by the USS underestimates the hazard, but we lack the data to prove or disprove this hypothesis.
Transmission System Vulnerability
The second author in preparing the AAES report demonstrated the earthquake vulnerability of the petroleum, electrical, and gas systems in the CEUS. These systems are lifelines that support the human population and are critical to maintaining the health and economic welfare of the nation. The vulnerability of each system is greatest in the NMZS to earthquakes. The largest earthquakes would probably occur within the epicentral area for the 1811 -1812 events, but there is significant activity in Southern Illinois and towards St Louis that could result in smaller events with a magnitude of M5 to M7.
The oil distribution system if breached in the Mississippi River Valley and discharging the equivalent of 20 kilometres of pipeline oil would release about 35,000 m 3 of product that is equivalent to 9 million barrels or 125 Olympic sized swimming pools. This represents a spill as large as the EXXON Valdez loss. The secondary loss is in the time taken to repair the pipeline and the time to divert oil from the national reserve to overcome the likely shortfalls in the East Coast. This system vulnerability is high to such a loss and it is recommended that no more oil distribution pipelines be routed on this corridor. It is recommended that any additional pipelines be routed further south well outside the NMZS. A similar comment applies to the natural gas and petroleum products pipelines. The National Security issues here are significant, and the design of all pipelines should include shut off systems to limit discharge to the Mississippi River or other rivers in the event of a sustained break or terrorist attack or earthquake. The response of authorities to a spill becomes problematic in an earthquake with anecdotal evidence from recent major international events suggesting a non-local response time of 24 hours. The spill could spread 150+ kilometres in one day at a river velocity of two metres per second.
The bottleneck in the electrical distribution system identified in the NEPDG Report coincides with the NMZS. The likely damage from earthquakes is to the secondary components of the system including the switchyards, substations, and converter stations, with the most probably damage from falling elements that have not been tied down to limit earthquake damage. The area without power in any event will probably be at least ten times the size of a similar interplate earthquake and significant in any are where the felt intensity is VII+. The issue of coal transport, and power station vulnerability has not changed since the release of the AAES report. The issue of pulse loading of power stations represents a risk that will need to be addressed in the renewal of licenses of power stations, where any building or element has a natural frequency in the range of 0.5 to 2 Hz.
Conclusions
If a destructive earthquake occurs in the cental or eastern United States then the likely damage to the energy distribution systems is dependent on the magnitude and location of the event. Three scenarios cover the likely range of events, a M5 to M6, M6 to M7, and M7+. The impact of an M5 to M6 would be felt within the meisoseismal area with the likely failure of the electrical distribution systems. The secondary impact on oil delivery that relies on electricity for pumping stations could cause temporary shortages in the eastern part of the US. The probability of an oil spill increases as the epicenter gets close to the pipeline and the magnitude of the event increases. The impact of an M7+ event would be significant, with the probable location for this size of event in the area of the New Madrid Seismic zone. The damage to the electrical distribution systems would be extensive in the meisoseismal area particularly for any felt intensity VII+ region. The damage to the pipeline distribution has t wo potential effects on the human population, the first is the disruption of the petrol-oil supply, and the second is the damage to the environment with an oil spill. A spill of the magnitude of the Exxon Valdez spill in the Mississippi River Valley or another river system would cause significant long-term pollutant problems. The threat of an earthquake in the CEUS is real. The likely consequences depend on the magnitude and location of the event, however there are a number of steps that can be taken to plan for this occurrence. The response of the authorities in the first day is critical to contain the damage and disruption to lifelines. The planning for the recovery is at this stage the critical element in any planning work for a loss scenario that could extend to a loss of lives and release of pollutants, particularly as there is limited opportunity to retrofit this massive human infrastructure, and the length of time since the last events provides a false sense of safety.
